The Role of Theory of Mind and Wishful Thinking in Children’s Moralizing Concepts of the Abrahamic God by Wolle, Redeate et al.
1 
RUNNING HEAD: MORALIZING GOD CONCEPTS 
 
The Role of Theory of Mind and Wishful Thinking in Children’s Moralizing Concepts of the 
Abrahamic God 
Redeate G. Wolle,a Abby McLaughlin,b and Larisa Heiphetzc 
 
a Department of Psychology, Columbia University. 1190 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 
10027, United States. E-mail: rgw2121@columbia.edu. Phone: 212-853-1407.  
b Department of Psychology, Columbia University. 1190 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 
10027, United States. E-mail: am4618@columbia.edu. Phone: 212-853-1406.  
c Department of Psychology, Columbia University. 1190 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 




Wolle, R. G., McLaughlin, A., & Heiphetz, L. (2021). The role of theory of mind and 
wishful thinking in children's moralizing concepts of the Abrahamic God. Journal of 








MORALIZING GOD CONCEPTS 
 
The authors thank Clara Apostolatos, Jenny Barshay, Grace Ding, Jared Fel, Devyani Goel, 
Lindsay Goolsby, Michael Herman, Brielle Internoscia, Rahil Kamath, Carolina Santiago-
Robles, Simran Suresh, Aaliyah Triumph, and Haley Ward for assistance with data collection 
and coding; James Dunlea, Megan Goldring, and Ayse Payir for their feedback; and the 
Brooklyn Children’s Museum, Traphagen Elementary School, and Crescent Elementary School 
for providing testing space. This project was made possible through the support of grant #61080 
from the John Templeton Foundation to LH. The opinions expressed in this publication are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. This 
work has also been supported (in part) by a Visiting Scholar award from the Russell Sage 
Foundation to LH. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and should not be 













MORALIZING GOD CONCEPTS 
Abstract 
 Adults conceptualize God as particularly knowledgeable—more knowledgeable than 
humans—about moral transgressions. We investigated how younger (4- to 5-year-old) and older 
(6- to 7-year-old) children view God’s moral knowledge. Cultural narratives in the United States 
portray God as omniscient, which could lead children growing up in the United States to 
conclude that God knows their own and others’ behaviors. However, older children are better 
able to distinguish between different minds, and this ability (theory of mind, or TOM) may 
predict a tendency for older, versus younger, children to attribute greater knowledge to God. 
Consistent with the latter possibility, 6- to 7-year-olds viewed God as more knowledgeable of 
their own and others’ transgressions than did 4- to 5-year-olds. TOM partially mediated this 
difference. Further, children—particularly 4- to 5-year-olds—conceptualized God as more 
knowledgeable of others' transgressions than of their own. Study 2 probed whether 4- to 5- year-
olds’ responses were due to wishful thinking (e.g., they did not want God to know their 
transgressions and therefore reported that God would lack this knowledge). Supporting this 
prediction, 4- to 5-year-olds attributed greater knowledge to God of their own, versus others’, 
pro-social acts. The extent to which children attributed knowledge of these acts to God predicted 
their own propensity to behave pro-socially by sharing with others. This work expands current 
understanding of religious cognition, particularly its connections with moral judgment and theory 
of mind. 
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The Role of Theory of Mind and Wishful Thinking in Children’s Moralizing Concepts of 
the Abrahamic God 
Learning to draw accurate inferences about others’ minds is a core component of 
cognitive development. Understanding that another person feels sad, knows when someone is 
lying, or believes that others have malicious intentions can help people navigate increasingly 
complex social situations as they get older. To many adults, it may also seem obvious that the 
universe contains different kinds of minds. Two different people may have different amounts of 
knowledge regarding the social and natural universe, but simply by virtue of having a human 
mind, both people know more than an earthworm and less than God. Over the past several 
decades, psychologists have learned a great deal about how children come to distinguish 
different human minds from one another. However, children’s reasoning about supernatural 
minds remains less well understood.  
The current work examined how children reason about God’s mind—an important case 
study because many people are explicitly taught that God’s mind is quite different from human 
minds. In particular, traditional theology in Abrahamic faiths (i.e., Islam, Judaism, Christianity) 
portrays God’s mind as omniscient and, therefore, unlike human minds (Barrett, 1999; Slone, 
2004). Because the majority of United States residents affiliate with one of the Abrahamic faiths 
(Pew Research Center, 2015), predominant cultural narratives arising from these traditions also 
represent God’s mind as distinct from human minds, although not all religions necessarily 
endorse this view. Children encounter these narratives in explicitly religious settings, such as 
places of worship. Even children from non-religious families can be exposed to such settings, as 
some parents who do not affiliate with a religion themselves nevertheless bring their children to 
religious services out of a sense that doing so may benefit their families (Ecklund & Lee, 2011). 
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Children may also encounter representations of God in secular places; for instance, in public 
schools, they may observe classmates praying, notice that some peers are wearing religious 
clothing and jewelry, or discuss religious topics with other students (Pew Research Center, 2019; 
Tratner et al., 2017). Children are able to learn from others’ testimony (Harris, Koenig, 
Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018), particularly when such testimony builds on capacities that children 
already possess and does not conflict with their first-hand observations (Lane & Harris, 2014; 
Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013).  Consequently, children may conclude that God’s mind differs 
from their own.  
However, young children also experience difficulty distinguishing their own minds from 
those of other humans. For example, preschoolers typically report that other people know what 
they know (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). These difficulties may lead children to conclude 
that all minds, including God’s supernatural mind, are similar to theirs. Classic findings suggest 
that theory of mind (TOM)—the ability to accurately reason about others’ mental states and 
distinguish one mind from another—emerges during the preschool years (Wellman et al., 2001). 
In one of the first studies demonstrating this effect (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), children heard 
stories about characters who put an object in a particular location and then left the room. While 
the characters were gone, a different person moved the object. Children then indicated where 
these characters would look for the object when they returned. None of the 3- to 4-year-olds, 
approximately half of 4- to 6-year-olds, and the majority of 6- to 9-year-olds reliably reported 
that characters would look in the location where they had left the object despite the fact that 
children had seen the object move to a new location.  
 Indeed, Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) work suggests that TOM abilities continue to 
develop even after the preschool years. More recent work supports this idea, showing 
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improvements in theory of mind after the age of four (Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2014; Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). For example, the ability to succeed on second-order TOM tasks—which ask 
participants to infer what one person believes about another person’s knowledge—typically 
develops only after children have learned to pass first-order TOM tasks, which only ask them to 
infer what one person believes about the state of the world (McGlamery, Ball, Henley, & 
Besozzi, 2007; Miller, 2009). Another task requiring TOM ability is understanding that the 
emotions people display may differ from their actual emotions; in one previous line of work, less 
than one-third of children between three and seven years old demonstrated this understanding 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004; see also Harris, Donnelly, Guz, & Pitt-Watson, 1986).  
 Although a large body of work has investigated how children reason about human minds, 
children’s reasoning about supernatural minds—which are often explicitly described as quite 
different from human minds (Barrett, 1999; Slone, 2004)—remains less clear. To the extent that 
past work has investigated children’s judgments regarding God’s mind, it has focused almost 
exclusively on God’s knowledge of physical facts, such as where particular objects are located. 
By the age of five, children reliably attribute more knowledge of physical facts to God than to 
humans (Barrett, Newman, & Richert, 2003; Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Knight, 2008; 
Richert & Barrett, 2005; Wigger, Paxson, & Ryan, 2013). However, children younger than 
approximately five years of age sometimes attribute to God only knowledge that they themselves 
possess (Gimenez-Dasi, Guerrero, & Harris, 2005; Kiessling & Perner, 2014; Lane, Wellman, & 
Evans, 2010; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007). Further, preschoolers do not understand 
omniscience in the same way as older children and adults. For instance, in one line of work, 3- to 
6.5-year-olds attributed less knowledge to an omniscient being (Ms. Smart, a being whom the 
experimenters described as knowing “everything about everything”) than did 6.5- to 12-year-olds 
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and adults (Lane et al., 2014). In other words, preschoolers were more likely than elementary 
schoolers and adults to view the knowledge of an omniscient being as limited in a similar way as 
the knowledge of ordinary human beings is limited. Together, these studies suggest that 
reasoning about God’s knowledge of facts may be linked with reasoning about humans’ 
knowledge of facts, as children begin distinguishing God’s mind from human minds around the 
same age that they begin to distinguish different human minds from one other.  
 Past work has not focused on how children might conceptualize God’s knowledge in 
other domains, such as morality, although some developmental research has addressed related 
questions. As described above, one project asked how 3- to 12-year-olds attribute knowledge of 
diverse information, including knowledge regarding past behaviors, to a fictional person 
described as omniscient (Lane et al., 2014). Another series of studies showed that 5- to 8-year-
olds attribute similar moral beliefs (e.g., that it is not okay to hit) to themselves, other humans, 
and God (Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2018). However, this work did not ask participants 
to attribute moral knowledge to God (e.g., whether God knows when people hit each other).   
 Children do link religious concepts with morality, attributing more moral behaviors to 
peers who share their religious beliefs than to religious out-group members (Heiphetz, Spelke, & 
Banaji, 2014) and taking religious versus secular motivation into account when determining how 
good or bad a particular behavior is (Heiphetz, Spelke, & Young, 2015). However, the bulk of 
the work examining moral attributions to God comes from the adult literature. Adults view God 
as a moralizing agent who knows and cares about moral transgressions (Norenzayan, 2013; Roes 
& Raymond, 2003). Although they explicitly report that God knows everything, adults attribute 
to God greater knowledge of morally relevant than neutral information (Purzycki, 2013) and are 
faster to report that God knows about bad acts than good acts or morally neutral information 
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(Purzycki et al., 2012). Building on this research, the current work examined how children 
attribute knowledge of morally relevant behaviors to God. Furthermore, to examine possible self-
other discrepancies, the current work asked children about God’s knowledge regarding their own 
behaviors as well as those performed by other people.    
Study 1 
 Study 1 tested two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, children can learn from 
others’ testimony (Harris et al., 2018), and cultural narratives in the United States often portray 
God as omniscient (Barrett, 1999; Slone, 2004). Thus, children may attribute broad knowledge to 
God, including knowledge of both their own transgressions and others’ transgressions. On the 
other hand, 4- to 5-year-olds have less well-developed TOM abilities compared with 6- to 7-
year-olds (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and may not understand that God can know moral 
information that they themselves do not know. Thus, older children may attribute greater 
knowledge to God than do younger children. Additionally, children know when they commit 
transgressions but do not necessarily know when others do so. Thus, younger children may 
attribute greater knowledge to God of their own transgressions (of which they would be aware 
when committing them) than of others’ transgressions (of which children may lack awareness; 
for work showing that preschoolers can reason about hypothetical behaviors, see Atance & 
O’Neill, 2005; Kuczaj & Daly, 1979). In testing between these hypotheses, Study 1 clarified how 
children attribute knowledge to God regarding both their own behaviors and others’ behaviors.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 72 4- to 5-year-olds and 70 6- to 7-year-olds. The 
demographics for the 4- to 5-year-olds were as follows: Mage=4.46 years, SDage=.50 years; 58% 
female; 35% White or European-American, 28% Black or African-American, 8% Asian or 
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Asian-American, 18% multiracial, 6% other, remainder unspecified; 19% Hispanic or Latina/o 
(families indicated ethnicity separately from race on our demographic questionnaire); 6% 
Protestant, 10% Catholic, 26% other Christian, 11% Jewish, 3% Muslim, 32% non-
religious/atheist/agnostic (these options were grouped together on our demographic 
questionnaire), 8% other, remainder unspecified. The demographics for the 6- to 7-year-olds 
were as follows: Mage=6.37 years, SDage=.49 years; 53% female; 33% White or European-
American, 14% Black or African-American, 11% Asian or Asian-American, 1% Native 
American/Pacific Islander, 23% multiracial, 11% other, remainder unspecified; 23% Hispanic or 
Latina/o; 1% Protestant, 19% Catholic, 24% other Christian, 13% Jewish, 3% Buddhist, 1% 
Hindu, 20% non-religious/atheist/agnostic; 11% other; remainder unspecified.1 Data from nine 
additional children were excluded because the child did not understand the study (n=1), because 
the parent or sibling interfered during testing (n=4), because the parent did not indicate the 
child’s age on the demographic questionnaire (n=1), and because the child observed their sibling 
complete the study immediately before participating, which may have influenced their own 
responses (n=3).2 We recruited participants via a lab database and in collaboration with a 
 
1 Preliminary analyses compared members of different religious groups in two ways. First, we 
compared children whose parents reported raising them in any kind of religious background with 
children whose parents identified their affiliation as non-religious/atheist/agnostic. We made this 
comparison because children who are raised in a religious tradition may make different 
judgments about God’s mind than children who are not raised in a religious tradition. Second, we 
compared children from Protestant, Catholic, and “other Christian” backgrounds with all other 
children. We made this comparison because Christianity is the dominant religious group in the 
United States, and members of the dominant group may differ from members of other groups. 
Here and in Study 2, religious background did not reliably predict children’s attributions of 
knowledge to God. Further, our pre-registered analyses did not focus on religious background, as 
this was not the main variable of interest in these studies. Therefore, the results presented below 
collapse across this variable.  
2 Similar attributions of knowledge to God as those reported below emerged when including all 
respondents in analyses. The 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects in the mediation 
models included zero when analyzing data from all respondents (attributions of knowledge 
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museum in the northeastern United States, and they received a small prize for participating 
(small toy for lab participants; sticker for museum participants).  
Procedure. The procedure and analyses for Study 1 were pre-registered, and the pre-
registration is available at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=46mg5g. An experimenter tested 
each participant individually. After obtaining written consent from the parent or legal guardian 
and verbal assent from the child, the experimenter administered a battery of standard TOM tasks 
followed by items regarding conceptualizations of God’s knowledge regarding the participants’ 
own and others’ transgressions. In line with recommendations for mediation designs, all TOM 
tasks (the hypothesized mediator) preceded all dependent measures (Baron & Kenny, 1986). We 
administered the TOM tasks in the order outlined below, with easier tasks occurring prior to 
more cognitively taxing tasks, in order to avoid depleting participants at the beginning of the 
study. The order of questions about God’s knowledge was counterbalanced across participants. 
While children completed the study, their parent or legal guardian completed a demographic 
questionnaire. 
 Participants first completed four frequently used TOM tasks that have been validated in 
prior research. To avoid ceiling effects, we selected tasks that vary in difficulty, such that even 
older children were expected to fail the more difficult tasks sometimes (Miller, 2009; Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). The four tasks were as follows: (1) False Belief Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), 
which tested whether participants understood that others could hold mistaken beliefs about the 
 
regarding others’ transgressions: .13 [-.05, .31]; attributions of knowledge regarding one’s own 
transgressions: .19 [-.02, .42]). In Study 2, only one respondent was excluded, and the reason 
was that he/she was not in the age group targeted by this study. Therefore, we performed Study 2 
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location of an object; (2) Unexpected Contents Task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988), which tested 
whether participants understood that others could hold mistaken beliefs about the contents of a 
container; (3) Real Apparent Emotion Task (Wellman & Liu, 2004; adapted from Harris et al., 
1986), which tested whether participants understood that people could conceal their true 
emotions; and (4) Second-Order TOM Task (McGlamery et al., 2007), which tested whether 
participants could attribute false beliefs to one person about the mental states of another person. 
For additional details about how we scored these tasks, see Supplemental Materials.   
 After completing all theory of mind tasks, participants attributed knowledge to God. In 
one block, they answered five questions about God’s knowledge of their own transgressions 
(e.g., “Do you think God knows if you take something that belongs to a classmate without 
asking?”). It was rare for children to protest that they would never commit these transgressions, 
but three children did make comments along these lines. In these cases, the experimenter re-
iterated that he or she was interested in whether God would know if children committed a 
transgression. All children answered the questions when the experimenter highlighted this 
hypothetical. In another block, participants indicated whether they thought God would know if 
another person committed those same transgressions (e.g., “Do you think that God knows if 
[Lisa/Larry, matched to participant’s gender] takes something that belongs to a classmate 
without asking?”).  
The experimenter prefaced both blocks by saying, “Now I’m going to ask you some 
questions about what you think God knows about [you/another person named Lisa/another 
person named Larry]. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; I just want to know 
whatever you think.” Transgression items were drawn from prior work (Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011; Heiphetz et al., 2015; Purzycki et al., 2012). In addition to the example above, the 
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other transgressions included saying something mean to a friend, telling a lie, being mean to 
someone at school, and pulling someone’s hair (see Appendix). Participants first responded 
“yes,” God would know about the transgression, or “no,” God would not know about the 
transgression. They then indicated whether they were “really sure,” “kind of sure,” or “not very 
sure” of their response. Responses were coded using a scale from -2.5 to +2.5. Because 
participants could not obtain a score of 0, this coding allowed for the distance between scores on 
the same side of 0 (e.g., -2.5, indicating that the participant was "very sure" regarding God's lack 
of knowledge, and -1.5, indicating that the participant was "kind of sure" regarding God's lack of 
knowledge) to correspond to the distance between scores on opposite sides of 0 (e.g., -0.5, 
indicating that the participant was "not very sure" about God's lack of knowledge, and +0.5, 
indicating that the participant was "not very sure" about the presence of God's knowledge). The 
order of blocks, and of questions within each block, was counterbalanced across participants.  
Results 
 To examine attributions of knowledge to God, we conducted a 2 (Participant Age: 
younger vs. older) x 2 (Target: self vs. other) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
second factor.3 This analysis revealed a main effect of Participant Age, F(1, 135)=35.74, p<.001, 
 
3 Our pre-registration specified particular comparisons of theoretical interest rather than the 
omnibus ANOVA, and we report the results of these comparisons here. First, to test whether 6- 
to 7-year-olds attributed to God a “high” level of knowledge about transgressions, we used a 
one-sample t-test to compare mean responses across the five “self” transgressions to zero (the 
scale’s midpoint), t(69)=7.42, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.89. We used a second one-sample t-test to 
perform the same analysis on mean responses across the five “other” transgressions, t(69)=9.71, 
p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.16. The fact that both means were significantly above zero indicates that 
older children did, in fact, attribute “high” levels of moral knowledge to God. Second, we tested 
whether 4- to 5-year-olds attributed to God less knowledge of others’ transgressions (a) than of 
their own transgressions and (b) than did 6- to 7-year-olds. To address the first of these 
possibilities, we conducted a paired-samples t-test comparing 4- to 5-year-olds’ responses to the 
“self” transgressions versus the “other” transgressions. Although 4- to 5-year-olds did distinguish 
between their own and others’ transgressions, the difference was in the opposite direction as 
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ηp2 =.21. Older children (M=1.38, SD=1.26) reported more certainty than did younger children 
(M=.03, SD=1.35) that God knew of transgressions. The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a main 
effect of Target, F(1, 135)=9.21, p=.003, ηp2 =.06. Participants reported more certainty that God 
knew others’ transgressions (M=.86, SD=1.48) than their own (M=.58, SD=1.67). The Participant 
Age x Target interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 135)=2.44, p=.121, ηp2 =.02. Figure 1 
illustrates these effects. Although 95% confidence intervals are often interpreted as indicating 
statistical significance, examining overlap between confidence intervals does not always lead to 
the same conclusion as performing a formal test of significance (e.g., Schenker & Gentleman, 
2001). 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
To investigate the link between attributions of knowledge to God and TOM, we 
calculated one TOM score for each participant. Scores represented a proportion in which the 
number of points participants earned for all the TOM tasks in which they passed the 
comprehension checks served as the numerator and the number of points possible for all the 
TOM tasks in which they passed the comprehension checks served as the denominator. Across 
all TOM tasks, the measures included six comprehension checks (see Supplementary Materials). 
When participants failed a comprehension check item, it was not clear how to interpret their 
responses to the main variables of interest (e.g., if a participant did not remember that someone 
had moved an object while the character in the story was out of the room, and then reported that 
 
what we expected: they were more likely to attribute knowledge to God when responding about 
others’ transgressions compared to their own (t(66)=-3.05, p=.003, Cohen’s d=-0.28). To address 
the second of these possibilities, we conducted an independent-samples t-test showing that 4- to 
5-year-olds were less likely than 6- to 7-year-olds to attribute knowledge of others’ 
transgressions to God (t(133)=-5.19, p<.001, Cohen’s d=-.90). For completeness, we also 
investigated whether 4- to 5-year-olds were less likely to attribute knowledge regarding their 
own transgressions to God, and found that they were (t(135)=-5.83, p<.001, Cohen’s d=-1.00). 
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the character would look for that object in the place where he had left it, it is not clear whether 
this response indicates theory of mind capacity or the belief that the character would look in the 
place where the participant falsely believes the object to be located). Thus, we did not include 
their incorrect responses to the target question(s) in the analysis for that particular task. The rates 
of failing comprehension check items were as follows: 19% of participants failed the 
comprehension checks in the False Belief Task; 6% of participants failed the comprehension 
check in the Unexpected Content Task; and 50% of participants failed the comprehension checks 
in the Second-Order TOM Task.4 For average TOM scores across age groups, see 
Supplementary Materials.  
To test whether TOM could explain age-related differences, we examined whether TOM 
mediated the difference between younger and older children’s attribution of knowledge to God 
regarding transgressions.5 To do so, we used PROCESS (Hayes, 2018) with 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples. Age group (younger versus older) was entered as the predictor variable, TOM as the 
mediator, and attributions of knowledge as the dependent variable. As shown in Figures 2-3, 
 
4 The Real Apparent Emotion Task did not include the same types of comprehension check 
questions as the other tasks. It did ask participants to recall components of the story, but the 
ability to demonstrate theory of mind on the main questions of interest did not depend on 
recalling those details (e.g., a child may understand that someone can display different emotions 
than the ones they truly feel without being able to readily recall why they want to do that). 
Therefore, our main analyses included responses to this task regardless of children's answers to 
the memory questions. Because this task was the only one that did not measure false beliefs and 
therefore had a different type of set-up from the other tasks, we also re-ran the mediation 
analyses using only the three false belief tasks and excluding the Real Apparent Emotion Task. 
These models showed a significant indirect effect when the dependent variable was God's 
knowledge of participants' own transgressions (.22 [.05, .44]) and did not show a significant 
indirect effect when the dependent variable was God's knowledge of others' transgressions (.12 [-
.03, .31]).  
5 We pre-registered analysis for only the “other” mediation, but we present both here for 
completeness.  
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TOM partially mediated the relation between participant’s age group and attributions of 
knowledge to God regarding both their own and others’ transgressions.  
[Insert Figure 2 near here] 
[Insert Figure 3 near here] 
Discussion 
 The main goal of Study 1 was to test between two hypotheses regarding children’s 
attributions of moral knowledge to God. On the one hand, because cultural narratives in the 
United States portray God as all-knowing (Barrett, 1999; Slone, 2004), children growing up in 
this culture may report that God has broad knowledge, including knowledge of others’ 
transgressions as well as the participants’ own. On the other hand, because older children are 
better able to distinguish between their own minds and others’ minds than are younger children, 
age-related differences based on TOM may emerge in attributions of knowledge to God.  
 Findings largely supported the second possibility. Older children readily attributed moral 
knowledge to God, more so than did younger children, and TOM abilities partially mediated this 
age difference. In other words, older children obtained higher scores than younger children on 
tasks measuring their ability to distinguish different agents’ minds from each other, and 
performance on these tasks predicted the extent to which children attributed moral knowledge to 
God. 
 However, one unexpected finding emerged: participants attributed to God greater 
knowledge of others’ transgressions than of their own. Neither of the alternative hypotheses we 
tested predicted this outcome. If children responded in line with cultural testimony, they should 
have attributed to God equally high knowledge of all transgressions; if they responded based on 
TOM abilities, they should have attributed to God more knowledge of their own transgressions, 
16 
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with which they would be familiar if they performed them, than of others’ transgressions. Study 
2 tested a possible explanation for this result.  
Study 2 
The main purpose of Study 2 was to investigate why children might attribute to God 
greater knowledge of others’ transgressions rather than their own. Although the omnibus 
ANOVA in Study 1 suggested that participants in general showed this pattern (e.g., we found a 
main effect of Target and did not observe a significant interaction with Participant Age), our pre-
registered pairwise comparisons indicated that this effect emerged particularly strongly among 4- 
to 5-year-olds. Therefore, we only recruited 4- to 5-year-olds in Study 2.  
One possibility is that young children engage in wishful thinking and therefore report that 
God is, to some extent, less likely to know about their own transgressions because they do not 
want God to know what they have done wrong. This account would explain why 4- to 5-year-
olds may have attributed to God somewhat greater knowledge of others’ transgressions than their 
own, as older children may be less prone to engage in wishful thinking (Bernard, Clement, & 
Mercier, 2016; Wente et al., in press). To test whether wishful thinking may have driven younger 
children’s responses in Study 1, we asked 4- to 5-year-olds about God’s knowledge of their own 
and others’ pro-social behaviors in addition to transgressions. If children in this age group are 
reporting what they want to be true, they may be more likely to report that God knows about 
their own, compared to others’, pro-social behaviors.  
A second goal of Study 2 was to examine links between attributions of moral knowledge 
to God and participants’ own behaviors. The more moral knowledge participants attribute to 
God, the more likely they may be to perform pro-social actions. In other words, children who are 
certain that God knows their actions may perform more of the kinds of behaviors that God 
17 
MORALIZING GOD CONCEPTS 
ostensibly prefers. Because United States culture typically portrays God as wanting people to 
perform pro-social behaviors (Evans, 2013; Hare, 2007; Heiphetz et al., 2018), attributing greater 
moral knowledge to God may predict greater pro-sociality.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited participants in partnership with two local elementary schools 
and a museum as well as via a lab database. Due to the schools’ request, participants recruited 
there did not receive a prize; other participants received a small toy (in lab) or sticker (at the 
museum). All participants resided in the northeastern United States. We tested 55 4- to 5-year-
olds (Mage=4.45 years, SDage=.50 years; 36% female; 62% White or European-American, 9% 
Black or African-American, 15% Asian or Asian-American, 11% multiracial, 2% other, 
remainder unspecified; 16% Hispanic or Latina/o; 5% Protestant, 36% Catholic, 16% other 
Christian, 2% Muslim, 4% Buddhist, 29% non-religious/atheist/agnostic, 7% other, remainder 
unspecified). Data from one additional respondent were excluded because the child aged out of 
the study before the interview was conducted.  
 Procedure. The procedure and analyses for Study 2 were pre-registered, and the pre-
registration is available at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=he34vt. The procedure was 
identical to Study 1, with three exceptions. First, participants in Study 2 did not complete any 
TOM tasks. Second, in addition to answering questions about their own and others' 
transgressions, participants answered questions about their own and others' pro-social actions 
(e.g., whether God would know if they/another person helped someone; for all items, see 
Appendix). Questions about transgressions and pro-social items appeared in an interleaved 
fashion in each block (e.g., in one version, participants might answer one question about a pro-
social action, two questions about transgressions, another question about a pro-social action, 
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etc.). Third, after answering all questions about God's knowledge, participants received five 
stickers. After giving the participant the stickers, the experimenter said, “So now we’re going to 
play a sticker game. You can decide how many stickers you want to give a kid you have never 
met who will play this game at a different place later. You can give as many stickers as you 
want, but you cannot keep any for yourself. Any stickers you want to give to the next kid can go 
in this envelope. Any stickers that you do not want to give to this person can go in the trash 
envelope here, and I will throw them away when we finish. Does that make sense? So, 
remember, any stickers you want to give will go in here [pointing to the first envelope] and any 
stickers you don’t want to give will go in here [pointing to the second envelope]. Okay, I’m 
going to turn around now, and you can decide what you want to do with the stickers. When 
you’ve made up your mind, just say ‘done.’” Participants then distributed the stickers as they 
saw fit.  
Study 2 contained three blocks. In one block, participants answered questions about 
God's knowledge of their own transgressions and pro-social actions. In another block, 
participants answered questions about God's knowledge of others' transgressions and pro-social 
actions. The order of the two blocks, and questions within each block, was counterbalanced 
across participants. In a third and final block, participants completed a sharing task. The sticker 
sharing task always appeared last and was not counterbalanced. 
Results  
To examine attributions of knowledge to God, we conducted a 2 (Target: self vs. other) x 
2 (Act: pro-social vs. transgression) within-subjects ANOVA (Figure 4). The main effect of 
Target did not reach significance, F(1, 54)=.09, p=.776, ηp2 =.002. However, the ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of Act, F(1, 54)=70.08, p<.001, ηp2 =.57: participants reported stronger 
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certainty that God knew their own and others’ pro-social actions (M=1.24, SD=0.89) versus 
transgressions (M=-.14, SD=0.95). 
The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a Target x Act interaction, F(1, 54)=15.33, p<.001, 
ηp2 =.22. To investigate this interaction, we conducted two types of pairwise comparisons. First, 
and of most relevance to our hypothesis regarding wishful thinking, we compared how 
participants attributed knowledge of their own versus another person’s pro-social acts and, 
separately, their own versus another person’s transgressions. This analysis included two 
comparisons; therefore, the significance threshold was p=.025 after a Bonferroni correction. 
Replicating Study 1, participants attributed to God greater knowledge of another person’s, versus 
their own, transgressions (p=.009, Cohen’s d =-.36). In contrast, and in line with the possibility 
that participants were engaging in wishful thinking, they attributed to God greater knowledge of 
their own, versus another person’s, pro-social acts (p=.002, Cohen’s d=.44). Second, we 
compared how participants attributed knowledge of pro-social versus anti-social acts performed 
by themselves and, separately, another person. This analysis included two comparisons; 
therefore, the significance threshold was p=.025 after a Bonferroni correction. Participants 
reported that God would have greater knowledge of pro-social acts, versus transgressions, 
performed by both themselves (p<.001, Cohen’s d =1.36) and another person (p=.001, Cohen’s d 
=.50). 
[Insert Figure 4 near here] 
To determine whether attributions of knowledge to God were associated with children’s 
own pro-social actions, we correlated attributions of knowledge regarding pro-social actions and 
transgressions with the number of stickers children shared with others. This analysis included 
two comparisons; therefore, p values needed to be .025 or lower to pass the Bonferroni-corrected 
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significance threshold. The more knowledge of pro-social actions children attributed to God, the 
more stickers they shared with others (r=.41, p=.002). The association between attributions of 
knowledge regarding transgressions and children’s generosity did not reach significance (r=.06, 
p=.670). 
Discussion 
The main goal of Study 2 was to investigate why participants in Study 1 may have 
attributed to God greater knowledge of others’ transgressions rather than their own. Study 2 
tested whether this result could have occurred due to children’s wishful thinking. Four- to five-
year-olds may have wanted to believe that God would lack knowledge of their own 
transgressions and therefore reported that God actually lacked such knowledge. Study 2 
supported this prediction by showing that children in this age group attributed greater knowledge 
of their own, versus others’, pro-social acts to God. This effect occurred despite the fact that 
Study 2 replicated the result from Study 1 showing that 4- to 5-year-olds attribute greater 
knowledge of others’, versus their own, transgressions to God. Taken together, these results 
suggest that preschoolers do not merely attribute to God greater knowledge of acts performed by 
either themselves or others. Rather, children’s attributions appear sensitive to the valence of the 
behavior.  
A second goal of Study 2 was to investigate potential links between attributions of moral 
knowledge to God and participants’ own actions. Here, we reasoned that children who exhibit 
more certainty that God knows about pro-social acts may be more likely to perform such acts 
themselves. Cultural narratives in the United States often portray God as wanting people to 
behave pro-socially, and children as well as adults largely endorse such narratives (Evans, 2013; 
Hare, 2007; Heiphetz et al., 2018). Therefore, greater certainty that God knows when people 
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engage in pro-social acts may be associated with a stronger propensity to perform those acts, 
which God presumably values. Study 2 supported this prediction by showing that the more 
participants attributed knowledge to God regarding pro-social acts, the more stickers they shared 
with another person.  
General Discussion 
Attributions of Moral Knowledge to God 
The current work examined how children attribute knowledge of morally relevant 
behaviors to God. We began with two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, cultural 
narratives often portray God as all-knowing (Barrett, 1999; Slone, 2004), and young children 
sometimes endorse testimony they hear from others (Harris et al., 2018). Therefore, children of 
all ages tested here may attribute high levels of knowledge regarding all types of morally 
relevant behaviors to God. On the other hand, young children possess less sophisticated skills 
than do older children in theory of mind, or TOM—the ability to reason about others’ mental 
states and distinguish others’ minds from their own (Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). Although classic studies addressing TOM have focused on children’s abilities to 
understand the existence of others’ false beliefs, more recent work suggests that TOM also 
mediates the ability to attribute knowledge that children themselves lack to supernatural agents 
(Lane et al., 2010). In other words, children who do not yet reliably pass TOM tasks are less 
likely than children who do pass such tasks to report that others may have information that the 
children themselves lack. Thus, younger children may infer that God’s mind is relatively similar 
to their own human mind and that God would only know about morally relevant behaviors with 
which children themselves would be familiar. Under this hypothesis, 6- to 7-year-olds (who have 
better-developed TOM abilities) would be more likely to attribute knowledge to God than would 
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4- to 5-year-olds (whose TOM abilities are still emerging). Supporting this second hypothesis, 
Study 1 showed that 6- to 7-year-olds attributed to God greater knowledge of transgressions than 
did 4- to 5-year-olds. TOM partially mediated this difference, suggesting that older children 
attributed greater knowledge to God because they were better able to distinguish God’s all-
knowing mind from humans’ more limited minds than were younger children.  
Study 2 followed up on a surprising result from Study 1 showing that children (4- to 5-
year-olds in particular) attributed to God somewhat greater knowledge of others’, rather than 
their own, transgressions. We reasoned that this result may have occurred due to wishful 
thinking. In other words, participants may have attributed somewhat less knowledge to God of 
their own, versus others’, transgressions because they did not want God to know about their own 
wrongdoings. Study 2 supported this hypothesis by (a) replicating the result that 4- to 5-year-olds 
attribute to God greater knowledge of others’, versus their own, transgressions and (b) showing 
an opposite result for pro-social acts, with 4- to 5-year-olds attributing to God greater knowledge 
of their own, versus others’, good deeds.  
Taken together, these findings extend work on children’s God concepts. Prior research in 
this area has focused on how children attribute knowledge of physical facts to God (for a review, 
see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2016; for exceptions, see Heiphetz et al., 2018; Lane et 
al., 2014). This prior work indicates that judgments regarding God’s supernatural mind are 
intertwined with judgments regarding humans’ ordinary minds, as changes in attributions of 
factual knowledge to God occur around the same age as changes in TOM. However, this has 
been established almost exclusively regarding factual knowledge, with tasks similar to those 
used to measure TOM. For instance, children’s ability to distinguish their own mind from the 
minds of other humans (by reporting that other humans will not know the contents of a box that 
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the child participant has seen but the other person has not seen) is associated with children’s 
ability to distinguish human minds from God’s mind (by reporting that God will know the 
contents of a box despite not having visual access to it; Lane et al., 2010). The current work 
extended this past research by showing that TOM measures such as those used in previous 
studies predict a very different type of outcome—attributing knowledge of morally relevant 
actions, which was not a feature of any of the TOM tasks, to God.  
The current findings also extend prior work on adults’ religious and moral cognition. 
Although adults report that God is omniscient, they attribute greater knowledge to God of 
transgressions than of pro-social or neutral behaviors on implicit tasks (Purzycki et al., 2012). In 
many domains, including religion, adults’ implicit responses track children’s explicit responses. 
For example, adults explicitly report that God is quite different from a person but implicitly view 
God as person-like. Adults’ implicit views align with children’s explicit responses, which often 
portray God as more person-like than do adults’ explicit responses (Heiphetz et al., 2016). From 
this perspective, it is surprising that children in Study 2 attributed to God greater knowledge of 
pro-social acts than of transgressions, since previous work has suggested that adults implicitly 
view God as more knowledgeable about morally blameworthy than morally praiseworthy acts 
(Purzycki et al., 2012). This result may have emerged because children are generally optimistic 
about others; they selectively attend to information that portrays others in a positive light 
(Boseovski, 2010) and view moral goodness as more innate and less changeable than moral 
badness (Heiphetz, 2019). By investigating children’s responses concerning conceptual questions 
that have previously been the focus of adult work (e.g., regarding the extent of God’s knowledge 
about morally relevant acts), the present work is well positioned to create a bridge between 
developmental psychology and areas of study that focus on adults, such as social and cognitive 
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psychology. In so doing, the current work unites research on religious cognition with 
investigations of other aspects of social cognitive development, such as optimism.  
Relation between Religious Cognition and Behavior 
As discussed above, the primary goal of Study 2 was to investigate why children attribute 
to God different amounts of knowledge of their own versus others’ morally relevant behaviors. A 
second goal was to determine the extent to which attributions of knowledge to God are 
associated with children’s own behaviors. In past work, individuals have conceptualized God as 
an agent who cares that people behave pro-socially (Norenzayan, 2013; Roes & Raymond, 
2003). Attributing greater knowledge to God of pro-social actions may therefore predict the 
extent to which children perform such actions. In other words, believing that God knows when 
pro-social actions occur and that God wants such actions to occur may be associated with an 
increased likelihood of actually performing such actions. Study 2 supported this prediction by 
showing that the more children attributed knowledge of pro-social acts to God, the more stickers 
they shared with an anonymous peer.  
This focus on behavior is an important contribution to work in the cognitive science of 
religion, which has largely emphasized cognition and attitudes. For instance, researchers have 
probed the extent to which children and adults endorse the existence of supernatural phenomena 
(Bering, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005; Davoodi et al., 2019), the types of properties that people 
attribute to God and other supernatural beings (Heiphetz et al., 2018; Shtulman, 2008), and the 
degree to which individuals prefer people who share their views of God (Heiphetz et al., 2015; 
Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012). These are all important questions, and answering them has 
done much to shape scientific understanding of religious cognition. At the same time, little is 
known about how such cognition might be associated with pro-social behavior, particularly 
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among children (for an exception focusing on adults, see Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & 
Norenzayan, 2016). The current work began to answer this question by showing that attributing 
greater knowledge of pro-social acts to God predicts children’s propensity to perform a particular 
pro-social act (sharing stickers) themselves. This behavior did not appear associated with 
attributing greater knowledge of transgressions, a result that future research can probe further. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The section above noted that attributions of knowledge to God regarding pro-social acts, 
but not of transgressions, predicted the extent to which children shared with others. Perhaps a 
link between attributions of knowledge regarding transgressions and children’s sharing behavior 
did not emerge because the behavior we tested was itself a pro-social act. Although failing to 
share could be considered a transgression, this interpretation may not have been salient to 
participants; pro-social acts are often considered supererogatory, and individuals do not always 
conceptualize the failure to perform these acts as a moral violation (Kahn, 1992). Future work 
could determine whether attributing greater knowledge of transgressions to God predicts the 
extent to which children refrain from transgressing, either by testing behaviors that are routinely 
viewed as transgressions (e.g., giving children the opportunity to cheat and seeing whether they 
are more likely to refrain if they attribute greater knowledge of transgressions to God) or by 
making a “transgression” interpretation more salient in our sticker-sharing task (e.g., telling 
children that failing to share is wrong). Of course, it is also possible that children’s behaviors are 
sensitive to attributions of knowledge regarding transgressions to God and that the task used here 
simply failed to capture this effect. In the absence of additional data, the present null effect 
should be interpreted with caution.  
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Future work can also further probe the role of religious testimony in children’s emerging 
understanding of God. The current work did not find strong differences based on participants’ 
religious background. However, all participants lived in the United States, which is a relatively 
religious country. It is possible that this broader cultural context shapes children’s religious 
understanding more strongly than the more limited religious context of their family. For instance, 
even children from non-religious families in the United States are familiar with the concept of 
God, perhaps because they have learned some religious ideas outside their family (e.g., from 
friends, classmates, and the media). In a less religious country, children may be less likely to 
attribute any mental states to God, and any religious concepts that children do have may not be 
associated with their actions.  
The results from the present study suggest that the testimony children receive regarding 
God’s omniscience may differ to some extent from the ways in which their developing TOM 
allows them to represent God’s mind. However, it is possible that testimony and cognitive 
development could reinforce each other in some circumstances. For instance, among older 
children and adults, narratives portraying God as omniscient could be particularly compelling 
because they complement these individuals’ understanding that others’ minds differ from their 
own (Lane & Harris, 2014). Additionally, although the current work provided evidence that 
TOM may underlie some age-related differences in attributions of some types of knowledge to 
God, we did not show that this is the only possible mechanism. Indeed, many social and 
cognitive processes change during the preschool and early elementary school years, and multiple 
factors could underlie the changes observed here. Future work can further probe the links 
between testimony and TOM and investigate other potential mechanisms underlying the age-
related changes observed here.  
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At a broader level, future work can investigate the extent to which the findings reported 
here generalize beyond God concepts. Children in preschool and early elementary school 
sometimes distinguish God from other agents. For instance, they attribute different types of 
factual knowledge to God versus their mother, an animal, or an imaginary friend (Barrett et al., 
2001; Wigger et al., 2013). It is possible that children also attribute moral knowledge to God in a 
special way. An alternative possibility is that the effect shown here generalizes to beings that are 
particularly associated with morality. Even if children would attribute greater moral knowledge 
to God than to a person or animal, they may draw fewer distinctions between God and an agent 
like Santa, who is explicitly described as knowing when children are “good” or “bad.” Scholars 
have argued that God concepts differ from Santa on a conceptual level (Barrett, 2008) and shown 
that adults distinguish between these two agents (Purzycki et al., 2012). Future work can 
determine how these views develop.  
Conclusions  
The current work investigated children’s attribution of moral knowledge to God as well 
as the link between such attributions and children’s own pro-social acts. In Study 1, 6- to 7-year-
olds attributed greater moral knowledge to God than did 4- to 5-year-olds, an effect partially 
mediated by performance on theory of mind tasks. An unexpected finding also emerged: children 
(particularly 4- to 5-year-olds) attributed to God greater knowledge of others’, versus their own, 
transgressions. Study 2 showed that this effect may have been the result of wishful thinking and 
further indicated that the extent to which 4- to 5-year-olds attributed knowledge of pro-social 
acts to God predicted their own propensity to share with others. Taken together, these findings 
indicate that psychological processes that do not appear religious on their face, such as theory of 
mind and wishful thinking, can shape children’s religious cognition. Such cognition, in turn, 
28 
MORALIZING GOD CONCEPTS 
predicts children’s likelihood of engaging in pro-social acts. Despite theological narratives 
portraying God as different from people, children’s religious cognition appears intertwined with 
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Appendix 
Participants were instructed to reply “yes” or “no” to each item below. The experimenter then 
asked, “Are you really sure, kind of sure, or not very sure about that?” In the “self” condition, 
the agent was “you” (e.g., “Do you think God knows if you say something mean to your 
friend?”). In the “other” condition, the agent was gender-matched to the participant (e.g., “Do 
you think that God knows if [Lisa/Larry] says something mean to [her/his] friend?”). 
Transgressions (Studies 1-2): 
Do you think God knows if [agent] says something mean to [agent’s] friend?  
Do you think God knows if [agent] tells [agent’s] mom a lie?  
Do you think God knows if [agent] takes something that belongs to a classmate without asking?    
Do you think God knows if [agent] is mean to someone in [agent’s] class at school?  
Study 1: Do you think God knows if [agent] pulls someone’s hair?  
Study 2: Do you think God knows if [agent] pushes someone and they fall down?  
Note: The final item was replaced in Study 2 to allow for a parallel pro-social behavior in that 
study (e.g., helping someone who fell down). 
Pro-Social Behaviors (Study 2): 
Do you think God knows if [agent] says something nice to [agent’s] friend?  
Do you think God knows if [agent] tells [agent’s] mom the truth?  
Do you think God knows if [agent] shares with a classmate?  
Do you think God knows if [agent] is nice to someone in [agent’s] class at school? 
Do you think God knows if [agent] helps someone when they fall down?  
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Younger children (0) 
vs.  
Older children (1) 
Theory of Mind (TOM) 
Attributions of knowledge 
regarding own 
transgressions 
.23 [.14, .32]; p<.001 1.20 [.30, 2.09]; p=.009 
Total: 1.50 [.99, 2.00]  
Direct: 1.22 [.68, 1.76] 
Indirect: .27 [.07, .53] 
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Younger children (0) 
vs.  
Older children (1) 
Theory of Mind (TOM) 




.22 [.13, .32]; p<.001 .93 [.12, 1.75]; p=.024 
Total: 1.20 [.74, 1.65]  
Direct: .99 [.50, 1.47] 
Indirect: .21 [.03, .42] 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Younger and older children’s average attribution of knowledge to God regarding their 
own and others’ transgression. Errors bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. Mediation model indicating that TOM partially mediated the relation between age 
group and attribution of knowledge to God regarding participants’ own transgressions. The 
numbers in brackets reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 3. Mediation model indicating that TOM partially mediated the relation between age 
group and attribution of knowledge to God regarding others’ transgressions. The numbers in 
brackets reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 4. Participant’s average attribution of knowledge to God for both self and others’ pro-
social behaviors and transgression. Errors bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
